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of Deniz Cem Önduygu

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What do you think if you notice that all the zeros in the book you’re reading have inverted stroke modulation? (The vertical parts are thinner than the horizontal parts.) You may think that there’s been a glitch in the font software. The moment of delight comes when you remember that the book you’re holding is A Universe From Nothing by physicist Lawrence Krauss who argues that the nature of nothing is quite different from what we thought: it is unstable and has to give rise to something. You may then think, as I first did, that the “0″ glyph of the font has been modified for this purpose but the original Stempel Garamond design actually has zeros with inverted strokes. I bet someone was reminded of this fact and chose the typeface with this clever detail in mind, though I wasn’t able to find out who did the typesetting. Even if this is pure coincidence, it’s too good to go unnoticed.

To be honest, I view physics as a much respected distant elder in comparison to biology which is like a lover to me. Ever since I did my first readings on quantum physics and relativity, I’ve always felt the famous barrier of intuitive understanding – the limits of our cognitive machinery evolved to function in “the Middle World”. My approach to contemporary physics and its deep questions as a layperson has been an indifferent one: “Even if we arrive at new answers, I won’t be able to understand them” – in a Searlean sense.

Krauss’s book has somewhat changed that. First, while he surveyed the recent (last century) developments in physics and cosmology, he managed to make me understand many things that I hadn’t quite understood in my previous readings. Moreover, the book regenerated the curiosity in me related to the big questions only physics can answer by making them more accessible and relevant, and convinced me that our flat universe with its total gravitational energy of zero can indeed come from almost nothing. (The last one was probably the easiest since I’m in no position to dispute.) I say “almost” because I can see how Krauss’s version of nothing is not going to satisfy those who ask the age-old metaphysical question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” As for me, I find the question too, well, metaphysical to be taken seriously.

If you’re curious but not enough to read the book, you can watch Krauss’s popular talk after which the book was written.

Biology as Ideology: The Doctrine of DNABiology as Ideology: The Doctrine of DNA by Richard C. Lewontin

Lewontin is a leftist and he couldn’t be more obvious about it. When he unconvincingly accuses all science of being ideological, it seems like he’s preparing the ground for and justifying the strong ideology behind his own writing. He refuses the extreme idea that genes are the source of all causation in the human sphere, only to replace them with bourgeoisie and capitalism! Yes, he takes particular delight in linking everything from reductionism as a scientific tool to the information-theoretical paradigm in biology back to “the bourgeois revolutions of the eighteenth century”. It’s funny how reductionistic leftists can become when trying to refute reductionism.

It’s one thing to dream of a more egalitarian, more democratic and more fair society; it’s another to filter facts according to that dream. I find this confusion especially troubling for a scientist: everything he writes suggests that if ever science shows beyond dispute that intelligence – or some other “good” human quality – is differentially inherited, he will reject that conclusion just because it’s not in line with his precious ideals of equality and fairness. (He actually has a go at it in the book, and maybe this isn’t much of a problem for him since he admits that scientists are inevitably ideological creatures.)

Speaking of fairness, I actually loved the book (1) because it is nicely designed and (2) because Lewontin certainly has a rare gift of balancing our thinking against the sometimes lazy Dawkins-Dennett line of thought by pointing out neglected perspectives and offering a lot of food for thought. The problem is that – just like his ally Gould – often he’s pushing it too far, to the point that the poor arguments injected at those specific points compromise his otherwise amazing authorship.

Another problem worth noting is that in some of the corrections he proposes for the Dawkinsian reductionism – again, just like Gould – he is actually overlapping with what Dawkins says, only with a different vocabulary: the contructionism (“the environment of organisms is coded in their DNA” – p.112) that he defends against adaptationism is the same as Dawkins’s concept of extended phenotype (1982), and the below passage with which he closes the book (1991) is one step shy of memetics (1976).

(…) the genes, in making possible the development of human consciousness, have surrendered their power both to determine the individual and its environment. They have been replaced by an entirely new level of causation, that of social interaction with its own laws and its own nature that can be understood and explored only through that unique form of experience, social action.

In this respect, he reminds me of Dennett’s metaphor for Gould in Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: the boy who cried wolf.

It’s a beautiful thing, the destruction of words. Of course the great wastage is in the verbs and adjectives, but there are hundreds of nouns that can be got rid of as well. It isn’t only the synonyms; there are also the antonyms. After all, what justification is there for a word which is simply the opposite of some other word? A word contains its opposite in itself. Take “good”, for instance. If you have a word like “good”, what need is there for a word like “bad”? “Ungood” will do just as well – better, because it’s an exact opposite, which the other is not. Or again, if you want a stronger version of “good”, what sense is there in having a whole string of vague useless words like “excellent” and “splendid” and all the rest of them? “Plusgood” covers the meaning, or “doubleplusgood” if you want something stronger still. Of course we use those forms already. but in the final version of Newspeak there’ll be nothing else. In the end the whole notion of goodness and badness will be covered by only six words – in reality, only one word. Don’t you see the beauty of that, Winston?

I know we’re supposed to be terrified by this but I actually see the beauty of that. It is true that you cannot (and shouldn’t, politically speaking) impose a designed language on the public but the idea of a modernistic, minimalistic reduction towards a less redundant and more modular language is appealing to me at least as a theoretical exercise. Apparently Orwell was also ambivalent about it: in a series of broadcasts to India that he produced from 1942 to 1944, he chose to use Basic English, an English-based controlled language (a simplified subset of English) created by Charles Kay Ogden in 1930, which would later be his inspiration for Newspeak in 1984. [There are in fact many constructed languagesVolapük being the cutest in my opinion.] I can feel that when he wrote the above passage for the lexicographer Syme, some part of him was still strongly empathizing with the character and seeing “the beauty of that”.

I would argue that Orwell’s ambivalence manifests itself throughout the book: even though he depicts with Oceania an extreme and horrible form of modernity, he actually takes the side of rational modernist thinking versus what could be called postmodernism – interestingly, represented also by the Party – on important crossroads, through the protagonist Winston’s thoughts:

In the end the Party would announce that two and two made five, and you would have to believe it. (…) Not merely the validity of experience, but the very existence of external reality, was tacitly denied by their philosophy. (…) His heart sank as he thought of the enormous power arrayed against him, the ease with which any Party intellectual would overthrow him in debate, the subtle arguments which he would not be able to understand, much less answer. And yet he was in the right! They were wrong and he was right. The obvious, the silly, and the true had got to be defended. Truisms are true, hold on to that! The solid world exists, its laws do not change. Stones are hard, water is wet, objects unsupported fall towards the Earth’s centre. With the feeling that he was speaking to O’Brien, and also that he was setting forth an important axiom, he wrote:

Freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two make four. If that is granted, all else follows.

If you’re not convinced that this passage relates to the modernism-postmodernism duality, here are O’Brien’s (a member of the Inner Party) words to Winston:

You believe that reality is something objective, external, existing in its own right. You also believe that the nature of reality is self-evident. When you delude yourself into thinking that you see something, you assume that everyone else sees the same thing as you. But I tell you, Winston, that reality is not external. Reality exists in the human mind, and nowhere else. Not in the individual mind, which can make mistakes, and in any case soon perishes: only in the mind of the Party, which is collective and immortal. Whatever the Party holds to be the truth, is truth. It is impossible to see reality except by looking through the eyes of the Party. (…) You must get rid of those nineteenth-century ideas about the laws of Nature. We make the laws of Nature. (…) Before man there was nothing. After man, if he could come to an end, there would be nothing. Outside man there is nothing.

You are imagining that there is something called human nature which will be outraged by what we do and will turn against us. But we create human nature. Men are infinitely malleable.

The resemblance of these sentences to postmodernist-poststructuralist thinking is striking, especially because these schools of thought weren’t around when the book was written; O’Brien dubs it “collective solipsism” in his dialogue with Winston. (The word postmodern was in use at that time, albeit only within the context of art/architecture in a much narrower sense.) Of course these ideas have their ancestors in the history of philosophy, but it is Orwell’s genius that he presented a staggering discussion of them with a novel written in 1948 in such a way that it nearly encapsulates the intellectual climate of the second half of the century. What is more intriguing to me is that he has managed to describe in a convincing way an oppressive regime that is both modernist and postmodernist to the core at the same time.

When we navigate the ocean, or when we predict an eclipse, we often find it convenient to assume that the Earth goes round the Sun and that the stars are millions upon millions of kilometres away. But what of it? Do you suppose it is beyond us to produce a dual system of astronomy? The stars can be near or distant, according as we need them. Do you suppose our mathematicians are unequal to that? Have you forgotten doublethink?

The concept of doublethink itself (the act of simultaneously accepting two mutually contradictory beliefs as correct), by the way, is one of the key features of postmodernist literature, both as a characteristic of it and as a cherished quality in other things.

So, on one hand Orwell criticizes modernism through a caricature (a full-scale minimalization and modularization of language, strict standardization of the living spaces and of people, total disconnection from the past, etc.) while on the other he defends, through Winston, modernist thinking against the postmodernist ideas of the Party. Was he exercising doublethink himself when he wrote the book? Maybe he was just lucky enough to live in a period when thinking outside the modern-postmodern paradigm was still the natural thing to do. Or maybe he was deliberately rejecting modernism and postmodernism, hoping for a third alternative – or indeed having no hope for humanity whatsoever.

In any case, I do believe that Orwell was expressing his own thoughts when he wrote these lines for Winston:

Being in a minority, even in a minority of one, did not make you mad. There was truth and there was untruth, and if you clung to the truth even against the whole world, you were not mad.

 

Dawkins vs Gould: Survival of the FittestDawkins vs Gould: Survival of the Fittest by Kim Sterelny

I had low expectations for this book because of its (typographically) cheesy cover design and clumsy typesetting. In the end it made me want to read his other books.

The author uses the debate between Dawkins and Gould to walk through many important topics in evolutionary biology, mentioning lots of other scientists and philosophers on the way, and successfully switching between detailed examples and the big picture. He definitely knows what he’s talking about, and his writing is so clear and concise that it somehow resonates with the in-your-face 12-point Baskerville it’s set with. Even so, I would recommend it to those who have read Dawkins/Gould and are somewhat familiar with their ideas. The book ends with an amazing Suggested Reading section where Sterelny makes useful comments on every book he suggests.

In any case, Kim, if you’re reading this: change your publisher. Your book deserves better design.

And this is something I did (based on the original) reflecting where I stand on the debate:

Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power (Columbia Themes in Philosophy)Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power by John R. Searle

Searle is always good at summarizing things, and the introduction entitled “Philosophy and the Basic Facts” offers a nice big-picture, including my favorite part of the book: a list of recent (last century) – and fortunate, in my opinion – changes in philosophy:

  1. Epistemology is no longer at the center of philosophy.
  2. Philosophy of language is no longer at the center of philosophy.
  3. Systematic large-scale philosophy is possible again.
  4. There is now no sharp distinction between philosophy and other disciplines.

The chapter on free will, however, comes along very dry as we witness the classic Searle reasoning through nothing but plain common sense and dismissing fruitful (and possibly accurate) ideas/theories on the basis that they are “intellectually very unsatisfying” (p. 62), or “literally incredible” (p. 77).

The most obvious and even fun case is on pages 45–46 where he literally uses his nemesis Dennett’s heterophenomenology approach (“Granted that we have the experience of freedom, is that experience valid or is it illusory?”), only to discard the illusion answer as it is “absolutely astounding”. One wonders how many more counter-intuitive facts we have to discover in order for him to abandon his intuitions; apparently the Copernican, Darwinian and Einsteinian revolutions weren’t enough.

In the end Searle declares that there are two viable answers to the question of free will: epiphenomenalism (i.e. free will in its ordinary sense is an illusion) and quantum indeterminism. For the latter, he bypasses the common criticism (“randomness isn’t freedom”) by proposing that randomness at the micro level may not necessarily imply randomness at the macro level. Yes, enter the almighty emergence…

For a book with a such promising title, it is hugely disappointing to find out that the two chapters “Free Will as a Problem in Neurobiology” and “Social Ontology and Political Power” were written separately and only relate to each other as parts of a “much larger philosophical enterprise”. Nevertheless, the second chapter has proved useful to me with the concept of “desire-independent reasons for action”, getting close to answering a question pending in my mind for years: What motivates a rational person to vote in elections while she knows that her single vote isn’t going to change anything?

I must confess that, despite all its disappointments, I realize that I still like the book. I fear it may be because it has a marvelous cover.